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ABSTRACT
As well as highlighting the importance of cost benefit analyses in decision- making processes where 
(expected) outcomes are very difficult to predict – given the degree of prevailing and potential risks 
and uncertainties, as well as the unquantifiable nature of such risks and uncertainties, this paper also 
illustrates  the  importance  of  complementary  measures  in  the  current  Basel  risk  based  capital 
adequacy framework.
As technological advances and societal changes contribute towards the generation of certain levels 
of risks – some of which were previously not in existence, it is increasingly becoming evident that 
risks  certainly  have  a  dual  nature.  Institutional  risks  comprise  of  risks  which  are  not  only 
attributable to the firm or organisation where models (such as internal controls) or techniques are 
operated, namely internal control risks, but also the risks involved in managing those risks.
In view of such uncertainties, and the continual evolution of risks, it becomes immediately apparent 
that certain outcomes cannot be predicted with high accuracy and certainty – hence the need to 
weigh the investment of high expenditure in such unpredictable outcomes. Is the desire to achieve 
comparability,  as well  as simplicity,  greater than the need to attain accurate,  reliable  and more 
relevant results through investment in more complex techniques? Such techniques involving not 
only initially high outlays but also costs (as well as risks) involved in managing such techniques? 
These constitute some of the questions which this paper attempts to address.
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A. Introduction
The current Basel capital adequacy framework, with its reliance on the risk-based capital at its core, 
has been considerably enhanced and improved in its goals to balance the objectives of:
− producing a sound minimum standard of capital adequacy for internationally active banks – 
whilst still being capable of application to smaller institutions;
− producing a well understood measure of capital adequacy that is comparable across banks 
and over time;
− support a reasonable level playing field between banks
This is evident from lessons drawn from the recent Financial Crisis – since flaws in relying upon 
capital measures, on their own, were revealed – hence compelling the need to introduce liquidity 
standards. Basel III has also witnessed a shift in focus from the previous objective of ensuring the 
soundness  of  individual  institutions  to,  additionally  safeguarding  the  stability  of  the  banking 
system. Current efforts in revising the Basel Leverage Ratio are also geared towards supporting a 
reasonable level playing field between banks.
Further,  in  assessing  whether  the  current  framework appropriately  and adequately balances  the 
objectives above, as set out in paragraph 29 of the Discussion Paper, „The Regulatory Framework: 
Balancing Risk Sensitivity, Simplicity and Comparability,“1 consideration is to be had to trade-offs 
required to find the right balance: Trade offs between costs in improving framework in a bid to 
improve complexity, risk sensitivity – at the possible expense of simplicity and comparability.
a)  Cost  benefit  analyses  and assessments  of  the  possible  benefits  that  can  be derived  from an 
investment in complex, advanced models and techniques which are incorporated into the regulatory 
framework. This is required since the engagement of complex techniques at extremely high costs, 
does not always guarantee that accuracy or more accurate results and predictions will be achieved 
by using such techniques.
b) Complexity of the Risk Based Capital Adequacy Framework (which is aimed at increasing its 
risk sensitivity, but which may result in reduced comparability) and whether such complexity has 
improved  its  performance  –  as  is  evident  from  the  recent  Financial  Crisis.  Such  complexity 
embraces  dynamism and the  ability  of  the  risk  based  capital  adequacy framework  to  adapt  to 
changes – as will be considered in the ensuing section.
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3B. Dynamism and the ability of the risk based capital adequacy framework (as well as its 
supplements/complements) to adapt to changes 
Within this context, it is also necessary to give due attention to theoretical considerations – as well 
as jurisdictional and environmental factors. The lessons drawn from bank stress testing techniques, 
as well as from the recent Financial Crisis, illustrate and indicate that even with the incorporation of 
more  sophisticated  models  into  the  risk  based  regulatory  framework,  certain  stress  testing 
techniques were still  not flexible2 enough to adapt to  environmental  changes.  It  should also be 
mentioned,  that  even  though  various  stress  testing  techniques  have  incorporated  historical 
scenarios,3 which could be considered to be premised (to an extent) on the „risk society“ theory, 
dynamic4 considerations were (and are) still lacking in such models. The risk society approach is 
one  that  identifies  broad  socio-economic  and  political  changes  which  occurred  in  late  modern 
societies.  „Alongside  these  changes,  loss  of  faith  in  institutions  and  authorities  and  a  greater 
awareness of the limits and uncertainties linked to science and technology have been identified“.5
Coupled with the inherent uncertain nature of risks is also the quantifiable, as well as unquantifiable 
aspect  and characteristic  of  risk.  In  this  regard,  it  is  important  to  distinguish between risk and 
uncertainty. Whilst risk is traditionally associated with probability calculations – which suggests 
that an event can be predicted and controlled, „uncertainty is not capable of measurement and deals 
with possibilities incapable of calculation which are based on guesswork and judgement“.6
To which  will  be added,  that  in  line  with the risk society theory,  risks  are  incapable  of  being 
predicted  or  measured  with  astute  accuracy –  even  though they are  still  more  predictable  and 
quantifiable  than  uncertainties.  Such  unquantifiable  nature  being  attributed  to  what  has  been 
highlighted under the risk society theory -  limits and uncertainties linked to science and technology, 
as well as the dynamism inherent in changes in science and technological developments.
In considering the features that make risk such a vital tool for regulation, Rothstein et al conclude 
that …....“risk provides an organizing concept for societal decision-making under uncertainty and is 
a  key  characteristic  of  modernity......as  regulatory  systems  attempt  to  control  events  that  have 
formerly been beyond control, the process of decision making transforms those events into risks as 
a way of rationally managing the limits of regulation.“7
2 „Stress testing frameworks were usually not flexible enough to respond quickly as the crisis evolved (eg inability to 
aggregate  exposures  quickly,  apply  new  scenarios  or  modify  models).“  See  Basel  Committee  on  Banking 
Supervision,   Principles  for  Sound  Stress  Testing  Practices  and  Supervision  May  2009  at  page   3 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs155.htm
3 „Most risk management models, including stress tests, use historical statistical relationships  to assess risk. They 
assume that risk is driven by a known and constant statistical process,  ie they assume that historical relationships 
constitute a good basis for forecasting the development of future risks. The crisis has revealed serious flaws with 
relying solely on such an approach.“ See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,  Principles for Sound Stress 
Testing Practices and Supervision May 2009 at page 5  http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs155.htm
4  The Financial Crisis also revealed that, especially in stressed conditions, „risk characteristics can change rapidly as 
reactions  by  market  participants  within  the  system  can  induce  feedback  effects  and  lead  to  system-wide 
interactions.“ see ibid at page  4. Furthermore, and in general, „stress tests of structured products suffered from the 
same problems as other risk management models in this area in that they failed to recognise that risk dynamics for 
structured instruments are different from those of similarly-rated cash instruments such as bonds.“
5 „Risk society“ theory also suggests that the focus on risk in government and regulatory circles is a response to a 
general realisation that there are limits to the ability to know or control the uncertainties related to late modernity.
6 See J Gray and J Hamilton, Implementing  Financial Regulation : Theory and Practice (2006) at page 20 
7 H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell „A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory Logics of Societal 
4Coupled with risks arising from the risk-society theory are also „man-made“ institutional risks or 
the risks of risk management. The shift towards the management of institutional risks and the risks 
of risk management are evident. Institutional risks and the risks of risk management should also be 
distinguished from the more natural occurring and inevitable societal risks which are less capable of 
being controlled.
As  previously  mentioned,  even  though  various  stress  testing  techniques  incorporated  historical 
scenarios into their models, this did not ensure the required level of predictability in averting the 
disstabilising events which occurred during the recent Financial Crisis.8 
C. Is it then worth the investment if despite all the expenditure, predictions can still not be 
made with the required and acceptable level of accuracy?
The answer to this partially lies with cost-benefit considerations as well as the overarching need to 
consider the fact that bank stress testing techniques, just as Basel leverage ratios (and the risk based 
capital  adequacy  framework,  the  Basel  liquidity  standards  and  other  monitoring  tools)  are  all 
intended to serve as complementary measures.
This underlines the point that such techniques or models should not ideally, be operated in isolation. 
Bank stress testing techniques, in their role as predictive, monitoring and risk management tools, 
are intended to serve as complements to the risk based adequacy framework, as well as the Basel 
leverage ratios and liquidity standards. In essence, they are a necessary and vital supplement to 
capital and liquidity measures.
Therefore, in undertaking a cost benefit analysis of the investments to be undertaken, the role of 
stress  testing  techniques  as  supplementary  measures,  to  an  extent,  should  also  be  taken  into 
consideration.
Furthermore, as re iterated previously, there is need for a balance between the desire for sufficient 
standardization (as a means of facilitating consistency, comparability and enhanced disclosures) and 
the need to invest in more complex techniques – even though greater complexity may result in 
reduced comparability and as a consequence of reduced standardization, result in the facilitation of 
regulatory capital arbitrage practices.
As a means of corroborating the points which have been highlighted, measures introduced by the 
Basel Committee, which are designed to reduce reliance on a single capital adequacy ratio as the 
primary means of ensuring the soundness of banks, are therefore welcomed. As indicated in the 
discussion  paper,  „The  Regulatory  Framework:  Balancing  Risk  Sensitivity,  Simplicity  and 
Comparability“, such measures introduced by the Basel Committee, include:9
and Institutional Risk“ (2006) Economy and Society (35) 1 at page 99
8 „Historical scenarios were frequently implemented based on a significant market event experienced in the past. Such 
stress tests were not able to capture risks in new products that have been at the centre of the crisis. Furthermore, the 
severity levels and duration of stress indicated by previous episodes proved to be inadequate. The length of the 
stress period was viewed as unprecedented and so historically based stress tests underestimated the level of risk and 
interaction between risks.“  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,  Principles for Sound Stress Testing 
Practices and Supervision May 2009 at page 5  http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs155.htm
9  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'The Regulatory Framework: Balancing Risk Sensitivity, Simplicity and 
5− The introduction of a leverage ratio
− An additional capital surcharge for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs)
− A proposed framework for measuring and controlling large exposures
− Minimum liquidity and funding standards
In support of the comments highlighted by the Committee in its discussion paper,10 „risk is indeed 
multi-faceted and far from straight forward to measure“ - and whilst a risk sensitive regulatory 
framework, definitely offers a number of benefits, the complexity resulting therefrom bears with it, 
„potentially adverse consequences.“
The risk based capital  regime should definitely remain at  the core and focus  of  the regulatory 
framework for banks – supported by liquidity and funding metrics, as well as other measures such 
as the leverage ratio.
Even though, as highlighted in the discussion paper, under paragraph 36, „the banking industry has 
contributed to the increasing complexity of the capital framework and the consequent reduction in 
comparability“,  such  a  contribution  to  the  complexity  also  partly  derives  from  circumstances 
beyond banks' control – namely , their very nature.
By their nature, bank holding companies (BHCs) are usually associated with subsidiaries – which 
usually  or  sometimes  operate  in  foreign  jurisdictions.  Hence  such  inevitability  needs  to  be 
considered in accepting the fact that a „one-size-fits-all“ approach is not workable for jurisdictions 
opearting and implementing Basel regulations.
Indeed, even though different treatments in the implementation of parts of Basel regulations across 
various  jurisdictions  may contribute  to  regulatory arbitrage  practices,  jurisdictions  which  over-
comply with standards, rather than under-comply are to be commended.
Hence a distinction should be drawn between those jurisdictions which, even though it appears, are 
not  consistently  implementing  standards,  are  nevertheless  applying  them at  a  level  and  degree 
which is considered to be above global standards.
Further, consideration needs to be given to the fact that jurisdictions are not expected to implement 
such standards in a manner which would result in their being placed at a competitive disadvantage.
The recent proposals  introduced in the U.S as a means of increasing the Basel Leverage Ratio 
provides  an illustration of this. The reasons and background for the introduction of such proposals 
need to be taken into acccount. As well as the proposals being aimed at minimising distortions in 
competition, „too-big-to-fail“ considerations and the need to reduce moral hazard constituted part of 
the impetus for the U.S agencies decision to proceed with the introduction of such proposals.
As  a  means  of  further  expressing  my support  for  the  risk  based  capital  adequacy framework, 
attention is drawn to the advantages of risk-sensitive capital requirements, namely, that they:11
Comparability' July 2013 at page 1
10 See ibid
11 Ibid at page 10
6− Allow supervisors to better identify banks' risk exposures and their individual risk profiles – 
hence demanding corresponding capital requirements
− Provide  fair  basis  for  a  level  playing  field  of  banks  in  systems  with  different  banking 
structures
− Strengthen comparability by reflecting a variety of different risk drivers
− Encourage better risk management by banks
− Allow banks to manage their businesses more efficiently in terms of the use of scarce capital
− Reduce incentives for regulatory arbitrage – if supported by clear and detailed requirements
Furthermore, as re iterated by the Committee, „to the extent that a degree of complexity achieves 
much more accurate risk measurement, it is an investment worth making. In practice, however, not 
all the intended benefits may be fully achievable.“
Reasons why intended benefits may not be fully achievable have already been highlighted: namely, 
the need for theoretical considerations (application of risk theories), the difficulties attributed to the 
quantifiability of risk, changes in society over time (risk society theories) which may affect the 
predictability  of  results  of  even  the  most  complex  and  highly  sophisticated  models  or 
supplementary tools used in connection with the risk based capital adequacy framework. 
Furthermore,  it  is  noted  that  many bank stress  testing techniques  have  incorporated reasonable 
considerations12 into their models – nevertheless still had problems with accurately predicting the 
events which generated and triggered the recent Financial Crisis. In this respect, whilst a certain 
degree  of  investment  is  worth the  effort,  it  does  not  always  guarantee the expected or  desired 
results.
For this reason, supplementary measures introduced by the Committee should operate together as 
intended – whilst attempting to keep costs as minimal as possible. Expenditure will also be required 
to  be  kept  at  a  minimal  level  since  the  present  capital  adequacy  framework,  indeed,  reflects 
developments in the financial sector over decades – and as rightly observed, „changes will need to 
be designed so as to preserve the benefits that the framework currently provides. Such changes 
probably requiring further investment and hence corresponding expenditure.
Furthermore, the tailor-made, risk sensitive nature of the capital adequacy framework facilitates its 
qualification as a suitable measure in the Committee's goals aimed at achieving greater accuracy 
and relevance in terms of results. Hence, further objectives that should be considered in reviewing 
the international capital  adequacy framework include the objectives of ensuring that the capital 
adequacy framework remains relevant and that measures operating within are also reliable.
12  „The management of most banks did not sufficiently question these limitations of more traditional risk management 
models used to derive stress testing outcomes nor did they sufficiently take account of qualitative expert judgment to 
develop  innovative  ad-hoc  stress  scenarios.  Therefore,  banks  generally  underestimated  the  strong  interlinkages 
between,  for  example,  the  lack  of  market  liquidity  and  funding liquidity  pressures.  The  reliance  on  historical 
relationships and ignoring reactions within the system implied that firms underestimated the interaction between 
risks  and  the  firm-wide  impact  of  severe  stress  scenarios.“   See  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision, 
Principles  for  Sound  Stress  Testing  Practices  and  Supervision  May  2009  at  pages  3-5 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs155.htm
7D. Conclusion: Potential Ideas to Improve Simplicity and Comparability
Which  ideas  offer  the  greatest  potential  benefit  in  terms  of  improving  the  balance  between 
simplicity, comparability, and risk sensitivity of the capital framework?
Two dimensions to comparability are highlighted by the Basel Committee in its discussion paper:13
− Comparability for a given bank over time
− Comparability between banks
A third dimension is proposed – comparability between banks over time – however such a time 
frame could be dependent on prevailing economic conditions. Comparability between banks over 
time would also require the consideration of jurisdictional factors.
A reasonable choice of the period of time over which comparisons are to be undertaken is definitely 
crucial in obtaining a clearer and more accurate picture of desired results.
In respect of focus accorded to the Three Pillars, more focus should be accorded to Pillar III (than 
was previously the case) – in line with the developments which have taken place over the years. As 
the recent Financial Crisis revealed, capital requirements on their own, are no longer sufficient in 
averting and containing global crises. Liquidity measures as well as other metrics have come into 
the equation.
The need for focus also applies to derivatives – given their magnitude and scale of operations. More 
off-balance  sheet  instruments  should  be  accounted  for  –  than  was  previously  the  case  –  and 
monitoring  techniques  adopted  to  enforce  such  a  move.  Immense  efforts  have  been  made  to 
facilitate greater disclosure – more efforts will be required to monitor and enforce the application 
and  implementation  of  rules  and  standards  which  serve  to  ensure  that  more  off-balance  sheet 
instruments  are  incorporated  within  many  ratios.  For  example,  recent  efforts  by  the  Basel 
Committee, as highlighted in its June 2013 Guidelines in relation to the Leverage Ratio proposals, 
are welcomed since many relevant items are being incorporated within the denominator as well as 
the numerator components of the ratio.
Off-balance sheet instruments and derivatives therefore constitute topics and areas for consideration 
in view of their magnitude – as well as their exposures.
13  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'The Regulatory Framework: Balancing Risk Sensitivity, Simplicity and 
Comparability' July 2013 at page 14
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